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Market Power Without A Large Market Share:
The Role of Imperfect Information and other
“Consumer Protection” Market Failures
Robert H. Lande1
March 8, 2007

There actually are two very different sources of market
power in antitrust cases. The first is traditional market
share-based market power.
Market power in antitrust cases also can come from
deception, significantly imperfect or asymmetric information,
unduly large transaction costs, or from other types of market
failures that usually are associated with consumer protection
violations.
However, instead of traditional end-use consumers being
harmed, the victims of this deception or imperfect information
are businesses. Since this can result in harm to competition
in entire markets, including higher prices, and these harms
may not be prevented by competition in the relevant markets,
they quite properly can give rise to antitrust violations.
In antitrust cases, when these “consumer protection”
market failures are present, market power can arise even if no
firm has a market share large enough for a finding of
traditional market share based market power. Although these
two manifestations of market power have very different
origins, either type produces the same result. Either can
give the firm possessing it the power to raise prices.
The “consumer protection” type of market power has been a
small part of the antitrust world for decades. It certainly
is used from time to time in mainstream antitrust cases. The
purpose of my Testimony will be to urge that it play an even
larger role in the day-to-day world of antitrust, perhaps
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almost as large as the role it plays in consumer protection
law.
At the end I will discuss some of the implications that
could arise for antitrust if we grant this source of market
power the attention it deserves. In addition to having an
effect on our beliefs as to when market power may be present,
it also could have important effects on such related antitrust
areas as market definition and entry analysis.

I. Market Power Requires A Market Failure.
A. Market Power From Large Market Shares
The conventional definition of market power is usually
expressed as “the power to raise price”.2 Or, colloquially,
one subject to pure competition takes its prices from the
interplay of supply and demand, while one with market power
has some amount of discretion to set its own price. The key
distinction for purposes of my Testimony involves the issue of
from where the discretion arises.
In the antitrust world, when we say “market power” we
almost always mean “market share based” market power. And, of
course, a firm can only have market share based market power
if it has a market share of at least 40% (or 60% or 90% or
whatever percentage of a relevant market is believed to be
enough). Even if some critical market share is reached, of
course, the firm has the power to raise prices3 only if entry
2

See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.8
(1984). By contrast, monopoly power is usually defined as “the
power to control prices or exclude competition.” See United
States v. E.I duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956). This testimony will not attempt to differentiate
market power from monopoly power. For a fuller and more
precise definition of these terms in general and relative to
one another see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande &
Steven C. Salop, Market Power and Monopoly Power In Antitrust
Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987).

3

Moreover, price issues are not the only considerations.
Market power also can distort non-price attributes
anticompetitively even if price is unaffected. See Neil W.
Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using The “Consumer Choice”
Approach To Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L.J. 175 (2007).
3

is difficult and other conditions are met.4 Even a large
market share only gives a firm the traditionally-defined power
to raise prices when a significant market failure is present.5
If the market is working well even a firm with a 100% market
share might have no ability to raise prices above the
competitive level for a significant period.6

4

This statement will not discuss product differentiation, and
whether it can create space between certain products and
potential substitutes in the eyes of some purchasers.

5

See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty:
A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65
Antitrust L.J. 713 (1997). ”A leading scholar of the subject,
Edwin Mansfield, believes that perfect competition requires
four conditions: product homogeneity, relatively small buyers
and sellers, mobile resources, and perfect information. Jack
Hirshleifer has considered the converse situation and provided
a list of three possible imperfections that can prevent a
market from functioning perfectly: imperfect information, time
lags, and transaction costs. Significant problems in any of
these areas can cause competition to be suboptimal.”
”Additional market failures are added to some other lists.
These further potential problems include coerced
decisionmaking, barriers to the entry of new firms,
circumstances of natural monopoly, positive or negative
externalities, and situations involving ‘public goods’, ‘free
riders’, ‘prisoner's dilemmas’, ‘lemons’, and adverse
selection. Despite disputes over taxonomy, this basic list of
factors that can plausibly cause competition to become
suboptimal is relatively noncontroversial.”
“Far more controversial is
market failures occur and,
action under the antitrust
might be appropriate.” Id.

the question of just how often
therefore, how often remedial
or consumer protection statutes
at 724-26.
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Such markets often are termed “contestable markets”. As the
American Antitrust Institute noted in its views about
contestability in its Statement on Concentration: ”There is
reason to doubt the empirical significance of the strongest
version of the ‘contestable market’ theory, which holds that
potential entry can cause even a monopolist benefiting from
significant economies of scale to price competitively. This
theory wrongly assumes both that entry requires no significant
4

Theoretically, in a perfect, frictionless world,
businesses could merge to monopoly or meet and fix prices.
This would result in a technical violation of the antitrust
laws. But it could not substantially harm consumer welfare
because perfect information among businesses and an absence of
transaction costs would allow some to quickly enter
monopolized or price-fixed markets and compete away
supracompetitive margins.
What makes antitrust injury possible in these
circumstances is the presence of market failures that are
external to consumers. Imperfections in the marketplace,
involving capital flows, time lags, search costs, faulty
information, and sunk costs, can enable a monopoly or cartel
to keep prices elevated for a significant period.7
B. Market Power from “Consumer Protection”
Market Failures
A firm also can obtain the ability to raise prices from
the types of market failures most often associated with
consumer protection violations.8 The most common of these
sunk costs (i.e., the entrant’s expenditures on inputs can be
fully recovered if entry fails) and that the monopolist’s
price response to entry is delayed.” See
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/296.pdf
7

See Averitt & Lande, supra note 5, at 730-33.
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The FTC has long described the necessary conditions for
effective consumer choice in market failure terms when it
pursues its consumer protection function:
The various components of the statute form an
integrated whole, allowing the Commission to promote
the diverse benefits of a free and open economy.
Thus the ban on unfair competition prevents
exclusionary or anti-competitive behavior and helps
preserve a full variety of marketplace options for
consumers to choose among; the ban on deception
helps ensure that consumers will not make that
choice on the basis of misleading information; and
the ban on unfair practices ensures that the choice
is not distorted by coercion, the withholding of
important information, or similar practices.
5

fall within five categories: (1) coercion; (2) undue
influence; (3) deception; (4) incomplete or asymmetric
information; or (5) unreliable, uncertain or overly confusing
information.9
This list of “consumer protection” market failures is
really not all that different from the types of market
failures that prevent entry to challenge a monopoly’s
dominance. However, consumer protection problems cannot occur
absent market failures occurring "inside the head" of ultimate
purchasers.10 Hypothetical purchasers who are perfectly
informed, rational, and intelligent can never be subject to
consumer protection abuses. Ordinary consumers, however, can
have greater difficulties.
It is crucial to note, however, that corporate officials
also can be victimized by deception or imperfect information.
Sometimes this will only affect that corporation, but
occasionally it can hurt competition in that market as a
whole.

C. Can These Constitute Antitrust Violations?
Can deception and these other market failures give rise
to antitrust violations, or should we instead term whatever
harms they cause “consumer protection” problems? It all
depends upon whether they distort the offerings of the market
in question.
This is because all antitrust violations have in common
the fact that they all affect or distort the offerings that
the market provides. They change the choices that would be
offered to consumers by the functioning of the free market
Safeguards at all three levels are needed to ensure
that substantial consumer injury is adequately
addressed.
Companion Statement on the Commission’s Consumer Unfairness
Jurisdiction, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,203 at 20,909-3
(1980).
9

10

See Averitt & Lande, supra note 5, at 733.
Id. at 729-34.
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competition.11 Consumer protection violations, by contrast,
detrimentally affect consumers’ ability to choose from among
the options provided by the market.12 When imperfect
information, deception or coercion distorts the options
offered by the market, this quite properly gives rise to an
antitrust violation.
It is crucial to note, however, that these consumer
protection violations, flowing from these “consumer
protection” market failures, can occur even if the firm
committing the act in question does not have a monopoly market
share. We prosecute a company that commits consumer fraud
even if its market share is small. We prosecute fraudulent
companies even if 80% of the sellers in their market are
honest.13
The same thing should be done - and is done - when these
“consumer protection” market failures give rise to antitrust
violations. This happens even if the firms in question do not
have a traditionally large market share at the time of the
alleged violation. To show how this already occurs in
antitrust, I will briefly discuss three well known singlefirm14 cases; Kodak,15 Rambus,16 and Jefferson Parish.17 Each
11

Id. at 718-720.

12

Id. at 720-722.

13

It is not controversial to note that consumers can be
victimized by routine fraud even if 95% of the sellers in a
market are honest. However, if the market generally is working
well and if 95% of the companies in it are honest, the
consumer protection function could be required less often than
if only 5% of the firms were honest.
14

For a discussion of collusive cases involving similar
information and search cost issues, see Robert H. Lande &
Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices,
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wisc. L. Rev. 941, 950-77 (2000).
15

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504
U.S. 451 (1992).
16

Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (2006).

17

Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

7

involved an alleged antitrust violation by a firm that did
not, before the violation, have a monopoly market share as
measured conventionally. Each relied upon a market failure
that is more often associated with consumer protection
violations, such as overly complicated information, a mistake
or unexpected change in corporate policy, transaction costs,
third party payments, and/or deception. Each presented
allegations which, if true, could have resulted in antitrust
harms.

II. Kodak
Kodak is the antitrust case that most prominently stands
for the proposition that market power can arise from
information that is imperfect or overly complicated. Kodak
also reminds us that just because businesses are involved we
should not assume they always will possess information perfect
enough to ensure a competitive outcome, or that a market that
seems to be competitive, when assessed in terms of traditional
market shares, inevitably will supply the necessary
information to the marketplace in a full and timely manner.
Kodak involved the firm’s requirement that its customers
purchase the firm’s maintenance services to obtain its spare
parts.19 What made the Kodak tie-in of special concern was
19

See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504
U.S. 451 (1992). Kodak had changed its photocopier service
policies around 1985, in an effort to limit the growth of
independent service organizations. Customers who had bought
copiers before the policy change were forced against their
expectations to pay higher prices as a result of this new tiein because they were already locked in to using Kodak
machines. For a more detailed discussion of this case see
Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect
Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 193 (1993).

8

that Kodak was found to have only 20-23% of the market for
sales of copier machines, and thus would not be considered
under normal market share standards to hold market power.20
A key to the Court’s decision was its concern over a
possible shift in Kodak’s policy that had been unanticipated
by its customers, and also over consumers’ inability to
calculate the life-cycle pricing of their copier repairs and
spare parts. Defendant’s alleged actions also could be
characterized as deceptive, or close to it, because it
violated an understanding that users would be allowed to
handle maintenance in a certain way over the lifetime of the
products.21 Due to a lock-in caused by the transaction costs
of switching to a different copier, they became vulnerable to
exploitation from Kodak’s tying arrangement.
Kodak also is significant because it reminded us that it
was possible for purchasers who were businesses, not
traditional end-use consumers, to be vulnerable to information
imperfections and complexities. Just because businesses are
involved we should not assume they always will possess
information perfect enough to ensure a competitive outcome, or
that a market that seems to be competitive when assessed in
terms of traditional market shares inevitably will supply the
necessary information to the marketplace in a full and timely
manner.
Kodak also held that switching costs can mean that the
time to measure market power - the ability of the seller of an
20

Kodak’s market share was, not surprisingly, in dispute. The
Court found, however, that it had 23% of the market for new
copiers and 20% of the market for new micrographic equipment.
See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d
612, 616, n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); Image Technical Serv., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 1993 WL 313162, *1 (N.D.Cal.)(Not reported
in F. Supp.).
21

This arguable deception by defendant is so important that
lower courts have found that full disclosure of such terms can
immunize a firm from Kodak liability. See, e.g., Merck Medco
Managed Care v. Rite Aid Corp., 1999 WL 691840, *6-*9 (4th
Cir. 1999); Cant Strip Corp. v. Schuller Int’l, Inc. 1995 WL
767805, *3-*5 (D.Ariz 1995); Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, 980
F.Supp. 1252, 1254-55 (1997); Alexander v. Phoenix Bond &
Indem. Co., 149 F.Supp.2d 989, 998-99 (2001).

9

aftermarket product to raise prices
the product is purchased. In these
might be found to have market power
modest share of the initial product

- sometimes will be after
situations the seller
even if it only has a
market. 22

III. Rambus and other cases allegedly involving the deception
of standards setting organizations.
A firm that has secured, or knows it is about to secure,
a patent on the intellectual property covered by a standard
might be able to misrepresent (either expressly or by silence)
to a standard setting organization that no such patent exists,
thereby inducing the adoption of a technology that relies on
the patent and thereby greatly increases its value. The firm
might be able to wait until the industry has committed itself
to the standard and has become locked in; and then assert its
patent rights.
The FTC’s case in Rambus involved essentially these
allegations.23 The FTC held, in effect, that Rambus was guilty
22

The FTC has brought a number of consumer protection cases
involving post-hoc contract breaches. Pursuing a tie-in or
other antitrust matter in these situations may be appropriate
in cases where consumers have been injured by faulty
information even if defendants possess no traditionallyassessed market share-based market power at the time of the
violation. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 347,
368 (1986) (company breached “lifetime” service contract by
raising annual renewal fees when it had promised not to do
so); cf. FTC v. Certified Merchant Services, Civ. Action No.
4:02cv44, Complaint 28-31 (E.D. Tex.) (unfairness authority
invoked to keep small businesses from being held subject to
contracts for credit card processing services on unfavorable
terms, when the adverse terms had been improperly added to the
contracts after signature), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/cmscmplnt.pdf. Of course, if
there is merely a policy change, but no reasonable
understanding of any promise that the policy would not be
changed, then there is no violation.
23

Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (2006). See Press
Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Finds Rambus Unlawfully
Obtained Monopoly Power, Aug. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/rambus.htm. The Commission
pursued a somewhat similar theory against Unocal. See Union
10

of illegally monopolizing the relevant markets even though the
company might have had no market power before the deception
was made - if market power were traditionally defined as
requiring a huge market share24 of a rigorously defined
market.25 Moreover, it would have been very difficult to
determine defendant’s market share at the time of the alleged
deception because its patents - or perhaps some other firm’s
patents - could have become crucial, or could have become
worth very little, depending upon the actions of the standard
setting organization.
But even if Rambus’ pre-deception market power was
uncertain if assessed under a conventional market share based
approach, the FTC found that it had the power to deceive the
standard setting organization in a manner that kept the market
from providing the benefits of competition. In this way, it
gave itself post-deception monopoly power.

Oil Co., FTC Docket No. 9305. Unocal involved charges that the
patent-holding firm deceived a unit of the California state
government as well as other industry participants. Unocal
eventually agreed to release the relevant patents to the
public as part of a settlement with the FTC, in the context of
the firm’s acquisition by Chevron. See Press Release, Federal
Trade Comm’n, Dual Consent Orders Resolve Competitive Concerns
About Chevron’s $18 Billion Purchase of Unocal, FTC’s 2003
Complaint Against Unocal (June 10, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/chevronunocal.htm.
24

A monopolization violation usually requires that defendant
possess at least 60% of a rigorously defined market. See
Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble Damages” Really Single
Damages? 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 149-51 (1993), showing that the
average monopolist between 1890 and 1992 had between a 75% and
85% market share, with almost none having less than a 60%
share. By contrast, however, monopsony power, on the buyer
side, may occur at lower levels of concentration. See Robert
H. Lande, Beware Buyer Power, LEGAL TIMES, July 12, 2004.
25

Some thought that the market power and market share
requirements of monopolization were unclear in, for example,
the Dell Computer case See Dell Computer, 121 F.T.C. 616, 632
(1996) (Azcuenaga, Comm’r, dissenting) (“the majority fails to
identify the relevant market in which market power assertedly
was ‘conferred’”).
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IV. Jefferson Parish
Jefferson Parish v. Hyde26 generalizes the idea that
market power can flow from “consumer protection” market
failures because it involved market failures other than
imperfect or deceptive information.
Jefferson Parish rejected a finding of market power by a
firm with a 30% market share,27 holding that this market share
was insufficient despite the existence of market imperfections
such as high transaction costs (the travel time of patients)
and “the prevalence of third party payment for health care
costs [which] reduces price competition, and a lack of
adequate information”.28 Even though this case seemed to
establish a 30% market power “safe harbor” in seller cases, it
did establish that market failures other than imperfect
information potentially can be crucial to a Court’s market
power determination.
26

466 U.S. 2 (1984).

27

Id. at 26.

28

Id. at 27. The Court noted: “East Jefferson's market share
alone was insufficient as a basis to infer market power, and
buttressed its conclusion by relying on "market imperfections"
that permit petitioners to charge noncompetitive prices for
hospital services: the prevalence of third party payment for
health care costs reduces price competition, and a lack of
adequate information renders consumers unable to evaluate the
quality of the medical care provided by competing hospitals.
While these factors may generate "market power" in some
abstract sense, they do not generate the kind of market power
that justifies condemnation of tying.” (Footnotes omitted.)
Omitted footnote 44 reads: “The Court of Appeals acknowledged
that absent these market imperfections, there was no basis for
applying the per se rule against tying. The contract at issue
here involved only one hospital out of at least twenty in the
area. Under the analysis applied to a truly competitive
market, appellant has failed to prove an illegal tying
arrangement." Id. at 1566.
Omitted footnote 45 reads: “Congress has found these market
imperfections to exist.”

12

V. Overview of Possible Implications
Imperfect information and other transaction costs are
everywhere. A crucial issue, however, is how significant they
must be before they can constitute a “market failure” that
should affect antitrust decisionmaking.29 This requires an
extremely difficult evaluation - as does the assessment of
traditional, market share based market power.
To the extent they exist significantly, however,
imperfect information and the other “consumer protection”
market failures can give firms some power unilaterally to
raise prices above competitive levels. This is because a firm
can to some extent be insulated from hard competition from its
rivals; a firm can to some extent be insulated from entry by
potential entrants, and these factors also can provide a
space, cushion, or isolation around consumers similar to that
created by market share-based market power.30
In all these situations the firms involved still compete,
its customers try to get the best deals, and other firms still
seek to enter. But the firms compete less effectively, the
customers search less effectively, and entry becomes less
likely. To the extent these tasks are made more difficult by
“consumer protection” market failures, prices can rise. The
isolation or cocoon has the same effects that would arise from
traditional market share based market power. This cushion whether between firms and consumers, between rivals, or
between existing firms and potential entrants - can enable the
beneficiary firm to raise prices.31 This pricing freedom is
the essence of market power.

29

When is information imperfect enough to affect the choices
of a large percentage of customers and detrimentally affect
competition in a market? Since information is almost never
perfect, this matter of degree can be of the utmost
importance.
30

For an extended discussion of these issues see Robert H.
Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing
Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wisc. L. Rev. 941 (2000).
31

Id.
13

If antitrust were to take these concepts significantly
more seriously than it does today, this could have profound
effects on the analysis of market power and related areas.
1. Market Share requirements for market power could
change.
Kodak had only 20-23% of its relevant market. In today’s
antitrust world, of course, it is almost inconceivable
that a firm with double this market share would be found
to have traditionally defined market power. Yet, if the
allegations in Kodak were true, competition in the market
did not protect consumers adequately, and the harms to
consumers were serious. When the market imperfections
discussed in this Testimony are present, ceteris paribus,
a lower market share should be required for a finding of
market power or monopoly power.
Another result is that we should be more cautious about
establishing substantial market share based safe harbors
in the Merger Guidelines or Joint Venture Guidelines, and
consider using the existing market share screens more
strictly.

2. Markets could be defined differently.
Imperfect information could create more narrowly defined
relevant markets because it could effectively prevent
customers from turning to certain potential substitutes.
Some customers might not know of an option's existence.32
If a significant number of potential consumers of plastic
conduit, certain types of student loans, or nonflorescent lightbulbs, were unaware of the existence of a
close substitute, perhaps the close substitute should not
be considered to be within the same relevant product
market.
Moreover, some customers might not realize that a
certain product is a cost effective option, and for other
customers the transaction costs of finding another choice
- or customers’ beliefs as to the size of these
32

Of course, sometimes customers who are good shoppers can
drive out fraudulent sellers and in other ways effectively
help poor shoppers.

14

transaction costs - might be so large that the firm in
question has some degree of pricing freedom.
To investigate these questions we should attempt to
ascertain the information about the products in question
that actually was in the minds of potential customers,
rivals, and entrants. This will tell us whether other
products effectively function as substitutes. It
introduces consumer behavior and therefore marketing
expertise into the antitrust equation. All this could
lead to markets being defined more narrowly and to larger
shares being imputed to certain firms within that market.
This could have the effect of making it more likely that
particular firms will be found to have market power.

3. Entry analysis could be significantly affected.
Entry that can take place within 2 years is considered
by the Merger Guidelines to be relatively easy and short
term.33 However, when we compute this period, we should
not always assume that would-be entrants instantly spot
the profit opportunity and instantly make the corporate
decision to enter. This certainly is not always true.
Sometimes it takes a considerable period before a profit
opportunity is noticed and a corporation makes and
decides to implement a decision to enter a market. Yet,
these factors are not considered in the Merge
Guidelines.34
Imperfect information similarly can affect firms’
decisions to enter markets in response to a 5-10%
price rise, and firms’ perceptions as to the time
required to enter markets. Moreover, the 5-10% test for
both entry and market definition would have to be
modified because potential entrant and customer reactions
to a 5-10% price rise would only “count” if they knew the
rise was due to market power. By contrast, perceptions
that prices rose due to increased costs or other factors
33

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997), 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13,104, especially Sections 1, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
34

Id. at Sections 1 and 3.
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would allow firms to increase prices without as much fear
of entry or resistance by powerful buyers.
Suppose potentially competing firms do not realize
that prices rose due to an increase in the market power
of the firm in question, but instead believed prices
increased due to cost increases? If they believed
the entire price rise was due to cost increases, they
might be very reluctant to enter. In these markets the
information imperfections would mean that a price
increase of more than 2 years due to increased market
power would not cause entry even though the price rise
actually was caused by market power. Thus, the Merger
Guidelines “likely” test for entry could be affected, as
well as its “timely” test.

VI

Conclusions:

The Underutilized Source of Market Power

No plaintiff has won an antitrust case at the Supreme
Court in more than a decade. The expansionist portions of some
of the cases I have cited were discussed in their respective
opinions mostly just as possibilities, moreover, and they
largely have been ignored by the lower courts in recent years.
Nevertheless, consumer protection law's assumptions about
individuals' capabilities, vulnerabilities, and needs should
apply to businesses (and officials from standard setting
organizations, and government officials) as well. Relatively
new lines of inquiry should be opened in many antitrust cases,
looking for evidence of information imperfections and other
“consumer protection” types of market failure.35 These
35

Predatory pricing may be impossible without imperfect
information. See Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An
Empirical and Theoretical Analysis of Alternative Predation
Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982). Zerbe & Cooper demonstrate
that to the extent we believe in the effects of information
imperfections, we are more likely to find that predation is
possible and likely.

16

principles have not been forgotten by the antitrust field, of
course, as Rambus and related cases demonstrate. But these
principles should be utilized more often.
It would be sound public policy to take the potential of
this form of market power more seriously. Deception,
imperfect information and other “consumer protection”
problems, when they have marketwide effects, and are not
likely to be prevented by competition in the relevant market,
should give rise to antitrust violations.
This is in part because they can cause harms to consumer
welfare in addition to the higher prices they cause, including
allocative inefficiency and umbrella effects. Antitrust
remedies, including treble damages, are indeed appropriate for
these situations. The single damages that would be awarded if
these cases were tried as consumer protection violations,
fraud, or business torts would provide significantly
inadequate deterrence.36
For these reasons, as the agencies contemplate future
dominant firm cases, they should give more attention to the
possibility that “consumer protection” market failures might
create market power even in relatively unconcentrated markets
and by defendants with relatively modest market shares.
A more serious consideration of the market failures
discussed in this Statement also would be consistent with the
ways we currently approach potential consumer protection
violations. As noted earlier, in these cases we routinely look
for market failures due to such factors as deception or
imperfect information, and we certainly would not decline to
prosecute a fraudulent seller just because it had a small
market share or because most of the firms in its market were
honest.
I urge the field to apply these insights more often in
antitrust cases as well. As the agencies contemplate future
dominant firm cases and any possible consensus Statement over
36

See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really
Single Damages? 54 Ohio State L.J. 115 (1993). This article
demonstrates that antitrust’s co-called “treble” damages, when
viewed correctly and in light of optimal deterrence, really
are only approximately single damages. A fortiori, damages
that were only 1/3 as large as antitrust damages would provide
substantially inadequate deterrence.
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how to deal with single-firm conduct, they should not exclude
the possibility that informational issues and other “consumer
protection” market failures might create market power despite
relatively low market shares.
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